

106D 577

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	52
--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----

DATE DISTR. 27 May 1954

NO. OF PAGES 5 50X1

SUPPLEMENT TO 50X1
REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
50X1

SOURCE

- CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO


CONFIDENTIAL

-2-




2. The rough sketch below indicates one method of organizing supply circles as far as distance was concerned. This presupposes that horses are utilized.

50X1



3. The following rough sketch indicates organization of supply circles if trucks are utilized.



CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

50X1

4. The following rough sketch indicates the system of supply circles considered most desirable by the Soviet Army and depends upon use of both trucks and horses. This system takes into account the poor Soviet roads and the lack of trucks, which was certainly true in the early 1940's at least.

System of "Zveno" considered best by the Army



If the railroads are near, then one might not use the army "zveno". If troops advance further from the railroad, one can then begin to use the army supply circle and expand its length up to 60 km. If, during the advance, horses had been used to such an extent, because of poor roads, that they were very tired and then the units reached an area of better roads, one could move the trucks up to the divisional "zveno" and rest the horses. However, the Soviet Government said "no" to such a solution because it assumed as a certainty that the USSR would have trucks at its disposal and would be fighting on enemy territory where the roads were better.

5. The following may give an example of the problems faced in regard to the "Til". In July 1941, three new Soviet armies were formed in Moscow. One of these was given 300 trucks for each of the six infantry divisions which were included in the army. One hundred of each 300 trucks were $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles. The other 200 were $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, which were the basic Soviet army trucks. Out of the 300 trucks, only about 30 or 35 were three axle vehicles, (similar to the US $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6 x 6 truck). The three axle trucks were utilized only for the purpose of pulling artillery pieces. When the army moved forward to Smolensk, it still had to obtain its supplies from Moscow, which was 320 km away, one way. As a result, there were not enough trucks even though the army was not in combat at that time and the divisions initially numbered only 7,600 men each. On 1 Sep 41 the divisions became $10\frac{1}{2}$ thousand men each and the number of trucks became even less adequate. Staff cars were normal passenger vehicles, which had been rubbed with dirt to make them less conspicuous. There were 30 staff cars per division and this was quite adequate. Each division had 150 or 200 bicycles to be used for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

50X1

reconnaissance and by messengers. Initially, no horses were provided. However, in September 1941, all the required horses were obtained. At this time the regimental "zveno" became based on horses and the army "zveno" on trucks. This was a practical organization. However, it should be pointed out that although the army had 100% of the horses it needed, it had only 50% of the required wagons (pavoski), only 25% of the needed harness, and 0% saddles. Obviously, only 25% of the horses could be used. The army was suffering from these disadvantages when in October 1941 the Germans attacked. The attack destroyed the army, and only one half of a division and the army staff escaped. All the rest were encircled and captured. The army was later reformed from new personnel.

6. It should be remembered that supply system characteristics of the Soviet Army will differ greatly for operations on Soviet and Polish soil, or for operations in Western Europe. In the USSR, the supply system would use railroads to a great extent and would utilize them as close to the front as possible. It would have to use horses because of lack of roads. Regimental supply must be horse drawn in that country if mobility is desired at all times of the year. Otherwise, snow and rain would stall military units. It should be recalled that there are roughly 15 good motor roads, with the necessary bridges, in a country like West Germany for one road in the USSR. If one attempted to use trucks for regimental supply then one should use the lightest possible trucks (one ton) and ones having good passability characteristics. Trucks larger than $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons should not be used.
7. In regard to the question of repair facilities, only artillery repair shops were fairly well organized in the Soviet Army. These were located near army artillery dumps.
8. As becomes apparent from my account, above, about the experiences of one of the Soviet armies formed in Moscow, the period June 1941 - June 1942 was one of improvisation. Horses were utilized more extensively in the south than near Moscow. Nowhere were there to be found more than the two "zveni", one for army and one for regiment. Military operations in the Ukraine utilized horses for both "zveni". Therefore, troops could not very well operate further than from 37 to 40 km away from a railway line: 25 km would be the length of an army supply circle and 12 km for the regimental. As can be seen, therefore, the 430 thousand trucks provided by the US as Lend-Lease material were absolutely vital to Soviet military operations.
9. There were no supply dumps (skladi) in division. There were only supply dumps in army and regiment. During most of World War II there were no corps in the Soviet Army. A regiment received only what it would consume during one or two days or what it would need in combat.
10. Basically then, all supply operations in the Soviet Army during World War II were improvised in an attempt to adjust to early defeats, lack of equipment, lack of planning, and the course of the war. For example, the Germans had air superiority in 1941 and 1942. Therefore, each army had several dumps located at various railway stations instead of just one army dump. Each service also had its own dumps, for dispersal purposes. There was some consolidation of supply dumps toward the end of World War II because the German Air Force was less feared. Usually an army would deliver supplies direct to a regiment. Later, however, "DOP" was quite often used. A "DOP" (Divisioni Obmeni Punkt) was a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

50X1

divisional supply exchange point. It was located in a rear area of a division where army would deliver supplies and the various regiments would pick up the supplies. Earlier in World War II, an army did not have its own trucks and merely delivered supplies to the nearest railway station, where divisional trucks would pick up the material and deliver it to regimental supply points, as the division did not have its own supply dumps. Later army took over the trucks from divisions. This was a better distribution of vehicles. Otherwise, if it were necessary to transfer a division from one army to another, it would require the use of too large a number of railway cars. In the USSR, operations depend very much on the use of railways. The Soviet Army depends extensively on quick repair of damaged railway lines and is experienced in this type of work.

-end-

LIBRARY

242	N
243	N
246	N
247	N
249	N

CONFIDENTIAL